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I teach you the overman.
Man is something that shall be overcome.
What have you done to overcome him? (8: p. 12)
Throughout Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Friedrich Nietzsche offers an
account of human value and meaning as “self-overcoming.”1 Rather than
offering a clear and precise model or a set of universal principles, Nietzsche
stresses growth, change, self-criticism, and self-improvement. Indeed, much
of his critique of morality (and philosophy) is targeted at what he sees as its
insistence on fixed and universal values, principles, and goals. The value of
human endeavor, for him, lies not in strict adherence to some fixed standard
or set of standards but rather in the constant transcendence of those
standards. I submit that the study of the martial arts is, in many ways, very
much in keeping with this aspect of Nietzsche’s ethos and, thus, serves as an
excellent vehicle for exploring and exemplifying Nietzschean self-overcoming.
At the same time, taking seriously Nietzsche’s account of self-overcoming can
help illuminate the martial arts not only as an object of study but, most
important, as an ongoing practice of self-overcoming. Drawing primarily
(though not exclusively) from Thus Spoke Zarathustra,2 this article will
explore the relation between the practice of the martial arts and Nietzschean
self-overcoming. Although my explicit focus will be on the martial arts, I will
point toward ways in which Nietzschean insights are applicable to many
different kinds of athletic endeavor.
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Nietzsche and Self-Overcoming
Overcoming, and especially self-overcoming, is one of the
central themes of Thus Spoke Zarathustra. The meaning of the
Übermensch, we are told, is that humanity is something that must be
overcome (8: p. 12). Put more pithily, it is overcoming that puts the
über in Übermensch. Life, as well, is “that which must always
overcome itself” (8: p. 115). Overcoming conjures images of struggle
(both physical and more “spiritual”), and this is surely crucial to
understanding the concept. But it also has associations with success in
general and resiliency in the face of hardship and, as directed toward
oneself, connotes introspection (but not pointless navel-gazing), selfknowledge, and self-critique. All of these themes find their place both
in Zarathustra the text and in the eponymous character himself.
Overcoming conjures images of conflict and struggle, as do the
martial arts, so it makes sense to begin there. Nietzsche’s account of
self-overcoming has a healthy dose of struggle with oneself and with
others. It entails struggle with oneself insofar as one seeks to
transcend one’s limitations (physical and mental) and move toward
ever more sophisticated, expressive, beautiful, and potent modes of
action and expression. Such “internal” conflicts with fear, insecurity,
ignorance, and hubris are all part of the ongoing process of selfovercoming for Nietzsche. Ultimately, as we shall see, it is in
struggling with and overcoming ourselves in this way that we live up
to our full potential as (fully) human beings.
At the same time, struggle with others can often hone and
facilitate this internal process, provided that those with whom we
struggle are in a position to offer a genuine challenge and are not
mere “pushovers.”3 Thus, we are urged by Zarathustra to seek
enemies with whom to struggle—enemies of whom we can be proud,
such that the successes of our enemies are our own (8: pp. 47–48). In
other words, we should not seek out those who can be easily
overcome but, rather, those whose talents and abilities will offer the
kind of challenge necessary to truly test our own capacities. It should
be stressed that it is the challenge itself that is the point here, not
merely the annihilation of enemies. Later in the same passage, while
discussing our pride in our enemies, Nietzsche draws a distinction
between “hating” (Hassen) and “despising” (Verachten) and urges us
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to eschew the latter attitude for the former. What is crucial in this
distinction for my purpose is that the original German makes clear the
sense in which one can harbor respect and regard for what one hates,
but to despise something is to see it as unworthy of regard or respect.
This is an admittedly awkward distinction to make in English (and
relies on what is effectively a Nietzschean term of art in German), and
so one must bear in mind the sense in which hatred requires time,
effort, and attention. One must, in other words, take the object of
one’s hatred seriously—hatred cannot entail indifference or disregard.4
Hatred in this context must be understood as divorced from despising
in this sense and also as purged of resentment. Indeed, for Nietzsche,
the line between genuine friends and our enemies is indistinct at best.
Even our friends, he tells us, should present us with struggles: “In a
friend one should have one’s best enemy. You should be closest to him
with your heart when you resist him” (8: p. 56). True friends and,
thus, true expressions of love, therefore, are not blindly accepting and
complacent but rather push the beloved to continuous selfimprovement. Self-overcoming is indeed a kind of struggle with one’s
enemies, one’s friends, and with oneself, though, as we shall see, all
of these struggles are intimately bound together in practice.
Furthermore, struggles with oneself and with others are likewise bound
together, for in struggling with others I better, and thus overcome,
myself, and in struggling with myself, I make myself a more worthy
and valuable adversary.
All of this struggle and conflict is not an end in itself, however.
Ultimately, the point of all this agonism (both with oneself and others)
is not destruction for its own sake but rather the creation of something
higher (8: p. 211; p. 214)—the transcendence of given standards of
value and the creation of something new out of the ashes of the old.
According to Nietzsche, humanity, both as individuals and as a whole,
is “a bridge and no end,” and so we must reflect on and overcome
ourselves so as to redeem the present and the past through the
creation of a new future (8: p. 198). We are most human when we are
pushing the boundaries of human expression (aesthetic, moral,
political, etc.). We must avoid preserving ourselves (8: p. 200) and
become instead “procreators and cultivators and sowers of the future”
(8: p. 203). Complacency, stasis, self-satisfaction, and the ossification
of values are all symptoms of decadence. Self-overcoming (and the
kinds of struggle that entails) is thus first and foremost the means
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whereby we avoid decadence and manifest the highest forms of
human flourishing.
The basic picture that emerges is this. In terms of morality and
aesthetics, the highest form of value is no particular value as such
(good will, eudemonia, pleasure, and the absence of pain) but rather
the creation of new values. We are urged to smash the old “tablets of
values” and inscribe new ones, all the while bearing in mind that these
new tablets are themselves only provisional and must eventually be
overcome, as well (8: pp. 205–206). In her important book Beyond
Nihilism: Nietzsche Without Masks, Ofelia Schutte emphasizes
Nietzsche’s valorization of “becoming” over and against “being” (12: p.
6). Overcoming, creating, esteeming, growing, changing, maturing,
struggling—all the recurring themes in Nietzsche’s corpus emphasize
processes of becoming rather than states of being. It is worth noting
that Nietzsche never once refers to a particular individual as “an
overman.” The Overman is a concept; it is something toward which we
strive—“a bridge and not an end” (8: p. 15). Self-overcoming, then, is
not something that one accomplishes. It is not an end state to be
achieved. At no point can one say “Now I have overcome myself, my
work is done here.” Instead, self-overcoming should be understood as
a never-ending process of self-appraisal, self-critique, and selfimprovement. The moment one gives up on this process or decides
one has finished is the moment, for Nietzsche, when one ceases to be
fully human in the most important sense—one has at this point
abandoned the change and movement of becoming for the
complacency, decadence, and ossification of being.

Self-Overcoming in the Martial Arts
At this point I would like to apply this account of selfovercoming to the martial arts. By way of establishing definitions and
a common framework, let me say that, for rhetorical purposes, I am
limiting my definition of “martial arts” to include only the styles and
systems that can roughly be called “traditional” in that they emphasize
internal training, respect for the (often ancient) roots of the
techniques, and style or “art” as much as, if not more than, practicality
and efficiency. Thus, the primary contrast would be between martial
arts, in this admittedly narrow sense, and systems of self-defense
(e.g., “street-fighting” techniques and military training) or sport (e.g.,
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Olympic tae kwon do, Ultimate Fighting, kickboxing). To be sure, a
properly Nietzschean genealogy of any martial art, as I am using the
term, would reveal roots in these more practical pursuits, but in the
contemporary context much of what we study in the martial arts (as I
am using the term) is less than truly practical in the more mundane
sense. By way of example, the styles and techniques that comprise the
martial art I now study developed, even within the Buddhist traditions,
out of the very “practical” goal of protecting the peoples of what is
now the Korean peninsula from foreign conquerors, but my present
study of feudal Korean sword techniques, or the empty-hand form
(Hyung) structured around “breaking” the 108 torments of the
Buddhist tradition, are not what one could call practical martial
techniques in an age of conceal-and-carry (as my beginning students
will inevitably point out).5 Over time, the martial arts have become
more than a mere means to (an admittedly important) end, they have
truly become an art.6 In short, martial arts function in the age of
handguns in a way analogous to calligraphy in an age of e-mail.
But this lack of instrumental practicality, this lack of efficiency,
is exactly where Nietzsche would begin to locate the value of the
martial arts (as an aesthetic expression and as a practice of selfovercoming). It is in the indifference to practical efficiency that one
creates room to turn the martial arts into an avenue for human
creativity and self-expression. This is because efficiency must always
be subservient to the demands of specific goals within specific
technological contexts—the means are always subordinate to the ends.
If efficiency (which is surely best achieved, if the goal is deadly force,
by modern explosive and projectile weapons) is no longer the goal,
then one can focus one’s attention less on the end and more on the
means, thus turning the refinement and improvement of a given
practice (means) itself into an end. Thus, transformed from an
instrument of violence and aggression, the study and practice of the
martial arts become a thing of beauty in their own right, even if one
has no expectation (or even desire) to ever use the martial arts for
truly violent purposes.7
What is special about the martial arts, however, especially from
the Nietzschean perspective, is that it must always be a practice and
never a product. Like one of Nietzsche’s own favorite metaphors,
dance (8: pp. 107–110 and p. 195; 7: pp. 245–248), the “art” of the
martial arts is only ever rendered through movement and is never a
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static “artifact.” One’s own body becomes the medium for a kind of
artistic expression that is always transient and ephemeral. It is kinetic
rather than static, a process of becoming rather than a manifestation
of being. Of particular importance is the fact that it is never perfected
or completed. Each iteration of a form or a technique is a kind of
practice, not only in the sense that it is a kind of bodily movement but
also in the sense that it is never in itself a perfect terminus of that
form or technique. The martial artist never expects to truly perfect his
or her art; it is always and can only ever be an ongoing striving.
It is in its character as a process or striving that martial arts can
be best understood as a kind of Nietzschean self-overcoming. Recall
that, for Nietzsche, the true worth of humanity is proved through
resistance to and overcoming of stasis, rigidity, and the ossification of
beliefs, values, and “truths.” This he refers to metaphorically as “the
spirit of gravity”—as a kind of inertia that we must constantly resist in
order to manifest our highest potential (8: pp. 107–108 and pp. 191–
195). Life itself, Nietzsche claims, is self-overcoming—it is power (will
to power) expressed through the decay and destruction of the old and
the creation of the new. When she first commits to training, the
martial artist effectively sets out to undertake a rigorous regime of
breaking down and ridding herself of old habits, both physical and
mental. She works toward the shaping of new ones with an eye toward
an ideal that is never completely grasped by the practitioner (as one
improves, one is able to perceive with more subtlety and depth, reveal
ever more layers of imperfection) and cannot ever be fully achieved.
Take, for example, the practice of forms (Kata in Japanese or
Hyung in Korean). The improving of stance work, the speed and
precision of the feet and hands, the clarity and focus of the mind,
balance, strength, and coordination—these are never-ending tasks
that are willingly taken up by each and every martial artist. The same
holds true for the practice of joint-manipulation techniques, grappling
techniques, and so on. One might say that training is simply repeating
the same movement or set of movements over and over, but this is
simply not the case. As one becomes more and more familiar and
comfortable with the movements through repetition, one actually
attains a better grasp of their function. This occurs on two levels. First,
epistemically, as one practices the technique or form, one comes to
understand better how and why it functions and how to improve it. All
of us who have trained seriously for some time can recall moments
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when, after the nth repetition of a form, some new “breakthrough” is
made, and we come to see and understand the form in a new way,
which in turn opens up new foci for future training. Second, physically,
one’s body becomes increasingly better at executing the movements—
a joint-locking technique, for example, can actually change from being
at first a series of steps, grabs, and twists into one smooth movement.
Most important, there is a reciprocal relationship between these two
levels. As one’s physical competence increases, new insights are
revealed on the more “epistemic” level, which in turn enhances
physical performance.
But the perfection of these techniques or forms is never
achieved. We could always use more practice, more training. There is
always room for improvement. To entertain the idea that one has
perfected some aspect of the martial arts is to miss one of its most
basic, though clichéd, insights: The practice of martial arts is about the
journey itself, not the destination. Or, as Nietzsche might prefer, it is
about becoming, not being. Thus, the martial artist has dedicated
herself to a never-ending process of self-improvement and selfcritique. She has herself become a medium for an artistic process of
self-expression. Through her training she is, in essence, recreating
herself in an explicit and self-conscious way. This is, in large part, why
the martial arts serve as such an excellent example of Nietzschean
self-overcoming.
There is also an important epistemic aspect of the martial arts in
relation to Nietzschean self-overcoming, in the sense of knowing the
material, as well as in the method by which one learns the material.
First, consider the way in which one learns and studies the martial
arts. To be sure, a good instructor can make a huge difference in the
quality of one’s training, but in the end, the value of the instruction is
contingent on the self-discipline, patience, and motivation of the
student. Instructors can demonstrate, correct, cajole, chastise, and
otherwise aid the student in learning and improving the material, but
she cannot simply hand over a collection of propositions to be
memorized and repeated.8 The student must on his own take up and
practice what he has been taught, and it is only through this practice
that we may say that he has truly learned the technique of form in
question. Indeed, the best instructors are not always the ones with the
most trophies or the most effective techniques or the prettiest forms,
but rather the ones who are best able to motivate and guide their
The Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, Vol. 34, No. 1 (May 2007): pg. 39-51. DOI. This article is © Taylor & Francis
(Routledge) and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Taylor & Francis
(Routledge) does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the
express permission from Taylor & Francis (Routledge).

7

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

students through what is ultimately an exercise in self-discipline.
Martial arts, as self-overcoming, is, in this way, an internally directed
effort, but insofar as the goal is physical/practical movement, it cannot
be understood as completely solipsistic, or indeed individualistic (a
point on which I shall elaborate later).
Consider further the best way to understand what it even means
to know or to have learned a particular aspect of the martial arts. Take
something relatively simple like beginning weapons training. When one
first begins to learn sword or staff, for instance, one learns and
practices the most basic kinds of manipulation of the weapon—a set of
basic cuts, thrusts, and blocks with the sword and various kinds of
spinning, striking, and blocking with the staff. One may later learn
weapons forms of increasing complexity and sparring, but even at the
most advanced levels of training significant time must be spent on
those first, most basic exercises. So what does it mean to say that one
knows a particular weapon or a particular joint-locking technique, or a
form? Given the impossibility of perfection as an end goal, that cannot
be our epistemic standard. At the same time, a basic grasp of the
movements is not sufficient either. Years after I may have “learned”
those basic cuts and thrusts with the sword, for example, I continue to
improve on them and in so doing improve the whole of my sword
technique. In that sense, I cannot say that I know them in the sense
of having fully perfected or “mastered” them, since I continue to see
room for improvement and refinement.
Here again, Nietzsche can be very helpful in addressing this
problem, which is a matter of our understanding of the conditions of
knowledge as such, especially within a specifically kinetic context.
Once again, Nietzsche’s epistemic position is subject to several
interpretations, much of which revolve around whether his
“perspectivism” (see 4: pp. 12–21) amounts to relativism and, if so, of
what kind. Regardless of the ultimate merit of such interpretations,
however, it is at least clear that Nietzsche did not understand himself
to be a relativist in this sense (see 11: pp. 52–117). He clearly
thought that some ways of thinking and valuing were better than
others. His epistemology allows for qualitative distinctions among
knowledge claims based, in part, on certain kinds of epistemic virtues
(some of which are agent centered, some of which are methodological)
and a rather robustly naturalized empiricism. Thus, it is not the case
that all knowledge claims are of equal merit, but this has far more to
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do with the way in which we go about offering and supporting our
knowledge claims than it does with their content on its own.
That is, the standard as Nietzsche describes it (see 9: pp. 45–49) is
focused more on process than product.
At the end of the day, Nietzsche can be understood as a
fallibilist—he holds that all knowledge claims, no matter how good they
may be, are always, as a matter of principle, provisional. There is,
once again, quite a wide array of difference in the exact interpretation
of Nietzsche’s epistemology, but there is general agreement on the
admittedly basic account I am offering here (see 3; 4; 10; 11). Thus,
while the interpretation of Nietzsche remains at best an inexact
science, there is strong textual support for the general claim that
knowledge, for Nietzsche, is never a fait accompli but rather an
ongoing process. It is, once again, a manifestation of becoming, rather
than a state of being.
So, returning to the question of “knowing” a particular weapon
or technique—the problem lies in thinking of the answer to the
question as an all-or-nothing proposition. As a kind of feat, such
knowledge is impossible. If at any point I think that I know a weapon
in the sense that I have learned all there is to know about it and that
my use of it is perfected, that can only be understood as either a
deliberate self-deception or a manifestation of hubris. However, if by
“knowing” I mean that I have begun to acquire and hone the
techniques and skills associated with the use of that weapon, then my
claim has merit. There are two important elements of taking this
approach seriously. First is the fact that the continued validity of my
knowledge claim is contingent on my continued practice with that
weapon—my knowledge lies, in part, in my continued commitment to
improvement. If I have stopped practicing, my knowledge claim is
immediately suspect.9 Second, this understanding of knowledge clearly
admits of degrees. I know the sword better than my students do, but
my instructors know it far better than I. Nevertheless, it is importantly
true that all of us (assuming our continued commitment to practice)
can rightly claim to know the sword. The knowledge, therefore, lies in
the overcoming (as an ongoing process) of ignorance and
incompetence. I know the weapon if I am engaged in the process of
improving my skills with it. The moment I begin to think of the
knowledge as a manifestation of being instead of becoming, I have
lost the real meaning of it.
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Finally, I would like to stress that thinking of martial arts as a
manifestation of self-overcoming does not commit one to an
understanding of the practice of the martial arts as solipsistic or
radically individualistic. To be sure, it is importantly self-directed, but
there is also a strong sense in which this is a fundamentally social
endeavor. I need instructors, fellow students, training partners,
sparring partners, and exemplars in order to get the most out of my
training. There is certainly an element of training that is individualistic.
I need to take the time to go over, repeat, rehearse—in short, to
train—on my own. But if I do not open myself up to the scrutiny and
critique of others, if I do not have real people with whom to practice,
if I do not have real (and “worthy”) partners against whom to test
myself, my training becomes far less effective and will ultimately
stagnate. Indeed, opponents of this sort are fundamental to my own
efforts toward self-improvement. By way of illustration, we find that
Zarathustra is constantly going away to his mountain to be with
himself, then coming back down to share and test what he has earned,
and then returning to the mountain, only to come back down again
later. The point again is to reject all-or-nothing dualisms. I cannot
accomplish much completely on my own, but I cannot hide behind or
lose myself among others, either (like the person whose training is
driven solely by the need to best all opponents). Ultimately, both of
these maneuvers can be understood as ways of hiding from oneself.
The people who spend all of their training time hiding alone in their
backyards cannot test themselves against others and learn from their
observations and insights, and those who seek only to best their
opponents are focused solely on the weaknesses and strengths of
others (their opponents) and come to grasp their own capacities only
in light of those others’ strengths and weaknesses. Self-overcoming,
therefore, is about not becoming complacent, either in solitude or in
company.

Objections and Responses
At this point, an important objection needs to be raised. All of
this is well and good, one might point out, but there is an obvious
tension, if not outright contradiction, between the emphasis I am
placing on traditional martial arts and Nietzsche’s valorization of value
creation, which seems to demand a dedicated disrespect for tradition.
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Such antitraditionalism must surely be at odds with the practice of the
martial arts I am here describing. How can one smash old tablets of
values when one is dedicating vast amounts of time and effort to
refining and honing techniques that are often centuries old? This is a
very serious challenge to the view I am offering but not, I submit, an
insurmountable one.
First, it should be noted that Nietzsche cannot be rejecting
traditional practices simply because they are old (his respect for
Hellenic art and culture attest to that). Neither does his ethic of value
creation demand that this creation emerge ex nihilo, so it is not simply
because there is a prior set of practices and techniques. Rather, the
threat that certain kinds of and approaches to tradition pose for
Nietzsche is their tendency to close off critique and revision.
Traditions, in this sense, cease to be changing, growing, and living
phenomena and become, instead, manifestations of decadence. This is
the kind of tradition that demands blind adherence and rules out a
priori anything that is inconsistent with the tradition. So the real
question is whether the martial arts are necessarily traditional in this
pernicious sense. To be sure, the practice of martial arts requires
consistency of training and a great deal of habituation, both mental
and physical. It also demands a respect for the history and tradition of
the art itself. But the cultivation of habit, up to a point (the habits
must not become ends in themselves), is something Nietzsche
explicitly praises (7: pp. 167–168). As for consistency, it is a virtue in
the pursuit of excellence but a liability if it becomes mere obstinacy.
Finally, as for respect, we have already seen that Nietzsche
understands true respect to be not only tolerant of critique but also
demanding of critical engagement with the object of our respect. What
emerges, in keeping with Nietzsche’s roots in philology, is an appeal to
a roughly Aristotelian mean (2: Book II). The practice of martial arts
does require a respect for tradition, but respect does not necessarily
entail blind conformity. Indeed, just as true friendship, for Nietzsche
(8: pp. 55–57) and for Aristotle (2: Book VIII), demands a willingness
to challenge the friend in an effort to help her realize her full potential,
genuine respect brings with it a willingness to question and critique in
the pursuit of excellence. Respect for tradition, in this sense, demands,
on the one hand, that one confront the tradition on its own terms and
seek to live up to its expectations but also, on the other hand, that
one views that tradition in a larger context of many traditions and
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practices and, when warranted, critically appraise and revise that
tradition.
Something must be said about what could count as “warrant” in
this context before this response can be taken seriously, however. If
the definition is too narrow, then the martial arts do seem to be
tradition bound in a way that is inconsistent with Nietzschean selfovercoming. There is, on the one hand, the more straightforward
technical sense. “Warrant” here might mean an alteration as a result
of some new insight from medicine or kinesiology. If it becomes clear
that some movement or technique does damage to one’s knees, for
instance, it might be time to revisit the traditional movement or
technique with an eye toward eliminating that danger. Of course, the
technical kind of warrant is not the only cause we might find to
challenge tradition. There are the more ideological aspects of
tradition—concepts of honor, relations between teacher and student,
attitudes toward women, and so on, that might prove inconsistent with
self-overcoming generally (not just for a specific practitioner) and thus
warrant revision or rejection. Overtly sexist or racist traditions should
be rejected not only because they inhibit the self-overcoming of their
targets but also because they manifest an other-focused sense of
value in the racist or sexist and thus inhibit self-overcoming for him,
as well.10 A relation of complete and total submission on the part of
students would likewise be inconsistent with self-overcoming insofar as
there needs to be an openness to critique on the part of all
participants. Revising or eliminating these traditions does not
necessarily entail a complete break with traditional martial arts, for
such ideologies are in no way central to the traditional identity of the
martial arts.11 Nor does revision or elimination mean a disrespect for
tradition generally, since the insistence of warrant—that there be a
compelling reason—demonstrates a respect for tradition as such (as
opposed to a blind adherence).
Once again, what is important is not that one follows a tradition
or practices an ancient art form but rather how one approaches that
tradition or art form. One should approach the traditional aspects of
the martial arts in a way that is respectful, yet open to critique and
revision. This is quite consistent with my view that the martial arts can
be understood as a manifestation of self-overcoming. They are a
means to an end, though that end can never be reached and is only
ever made manifest in the striving after it. In some ways, it is
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precisely because of the more traditional aspects of the martial arts
that they are such fertile ground for self-overcoming. The tradition can
offer a rich resource and framework for challenging oneself insofar as
it serves as a context in which to strive for a kind of aesthetic
perfection (again, this should be understood only as an ideal
approached asymptotically). The tradition is not, in other words, a set
and fixed standard to which one must adhere but is rather an ideal
that is constantly re-forming itself as one becomes more and more
familiar with it. It is not tradition for tradition’s sake, which Nietzsche
would surely reject, but rather tradition for the sake of selfovercoming. Just as creative endeavors like music require some form
and structure within which to find one’s voice (figuratively or literally),
the traditional forms and structures of the martial arts provide a
context for genuinely creative self-expression that is, nevertheless,
respectful of tradition. With this in mind, one can see that the respect
for tradition characteristic of the martial arts need not be antithetical
to Nietzsche’s valorization of creativity.
A related concern with my account would be to point toward
what appear to be significant differences between Nietzsche and the
Buddhist tradition that informs many of the traditional martial arts.
Buddhism’s emphasis on humility, on life as suffering, and the illusory
status of the self, for instance, seem inconsistent with much of
Nietzsche’s own views. Indeed, Nietzsche explicitly takes Buddhism to
task in Beyond Good and Evil (6: p. 68, pp. 72–74, and pp. 115–117),
for example. Thus, it would seem that there is a serious tension
between Nietzsche and any practice informed by or even sympathetic
to Buddhist philosophy.
If one understands Buddhist contemplative practice to be
directed toward a specific goal, such as Satori, Nirvana, or
enlightenment, and that those goals can be properly understood as an
end state, then there is a clear conflict. If one understands the
Buddhist emphasis on humility to require a complete self-mortification
akin to asceticism, then again there is conflict. This is not the only way
to understand these Buddhist concepts, however. If one emphasizes
the relation between Nirvana and contemplative practice, one can
understand the concept as antithetical to an end-state and exactly the
sort of process, the sort of Becoming, that is central to selfovercoming. If one understands humility to be an awareness of
fallibility and openness to critique, and if one emphasizes the middle
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way between hedonism and asceticism, then there is reason to believe
that Nietzsche and the martial arts are quite compatible. Indeed, there
has been a great deal of interest in the relation between Nietzsche and
Buddhism generally, and there are those who suggest that they are far
more compatible than Nietzsche himself realized. Robert G. Morrison,
for example, has argued that Nietzsche’s criticisms of Buddhism were
based on misunderstanding and that there is ultimately quite a bit that
is Buddhist about Nietzsche and vice versa (5).
This remains very much a live debate in any event. Indeed,
there are tensions not only between Nietzsche and Buddhist thought
but also between the ethos of the martial arts themselves and at least
some varieties of Buddhism. Shaolin kung fu traces its origin to
Buddhist monks on the one hand, while on the other hand Theravada
and Tibetan Buddhism espouse nonviolence or pacifism.12 Exploring
the various interpretations of central Buddhist tenets, assessing the
accuracy of Nietzsche’s critique of Buddhism, and exploring the
tensions with various martial arts simply cannot be undertaken in this
essay, however. It will have to suffice to allow that there are
reasonable interpretations of both Nietzsche and Buddhism that allow
for compatibility between them, as well as the martial arts, and so the
conflict between them is far from obvious and inevitable.

Beyond the Martial Arts
Another significant concern with my view might be that some
roughly similar account could be applied to any athletic endeavor and
that there is nothing peculiar about the martial arts, as such, in this
regard. Training to play soccer could very well be approached in the
same way, and so striving toward the unattainable perfection of one’s
skills as a goalie could become a kind of self-overcoming. This is surely
true. If one were to approach any athletic endeavor in a similar spirit,
it would seem to meet the criteria for self-overcoming that I have
sketched here. One would surely find that a significant number of the
very best athletes in any sport view their training in roughly the way I
have been describing. I do not hold that there is something unique or
necessary about martial arts in this regard. Being a martial artist, in
other words, is not a necessary condition for understanding one’s
training as self-overcoming.
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What does set the martial arts apart is the extent to which they
are particularly conducive to the kind of approach I have been
describing here and often explicitly endorse it. It is part of the very
ethos of the martial arts themselves that one approach one’s study in
the manner I am describing. Thus, my argument is not that it is only
through martial arts that these self-overcoming aspects are realized,
but only that the martial arts are particularly well suited to this
understanding. In fact, most athletes in competitive sports (distance
runners, I submit, might be an exception here) use their training in
exactly the way that I have suggested genuine martial arts (in the
sense, at least, that I have been using the term) rule out. There is a
definite and external goal to training and honing one’s abilities, and
that is victory.13 One does not train for the sake of self-expression and
self-overcoming. Rather, one trains to win. In the martial arts, what
explicit competition there tends to be is subservient to training, rather
than the other way around. That is, one’s competition with others just
is a kind of training. One competes in order to train, one does not train
in order to compete, and this is a highly significant difference between
the martial arts and most other forms of athletic pursuit.14
Sparring, for example, is foremost a kind of training, and
through its competitive aspects one comes to a better realization of
one’s own weaknesses so that one can further improve one’s training.
Tournaments, when they work well,15 perform the same function. The
competition at the tournament is not the goal but rather a means to
celebrate and further explore one’s own progress. For Nietzsche, it is
in competition (good friends and good enemies) that we come best to
know our own strengths and weaknesses, so that we can overcome
them. The same holds true for the martial arts. In publicly
demonstrating one’s abilities to others and competing against others
one opens oneself up to the critical scrutiny of those others, which can
clearly be an extremely useful tool for self-overcoming. Again, not
every tournament, or every competition, will manifest this kind of
ethos. There are always tournaments (and individual participants) in
which the central goal is the humiliation of the opponent—where the
victory is the goal, not the training. This is why martial artists should
follow Nietzsche’s advice to choose wisely with whom they train and
compete so that they can be challenged in a way that will best improve
their training. The end goal of the martial arts is always the training
itself and, ultimately, more and better training. The goal is selfThe Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, Vol. 34, No. 1 (May 2007): pg. 39-51. DOI. This article is © Taylor & Francis
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perfection as a manifestation of becoming, not being, and that is
something peculiar to the martial arts shared by very few other
athletic pursuits.

Conclusion
The practice of the martial arts, I have argued, can be fruitfully
understood as a kind of manifestation of Nietzschean self-overcoming.
The martial arts serves as a helpful example of this Nietzschean
concept, and thinking about the martial arts through the lens of selfovercoming illuminates important aspects of the methodology and
ethos of martial arts training and practice. Every professional Kuk Sool
Won school (which is the art I practice) has the maxim “We Need More
Practice” displayed prominently in the do jahng (training facility or
school). This is in many ways a perfect summary of martial arts as
self-overcoming—it is about testing oneself, working through failure,
and always, to use an important Nietzschean concept, “becoming what
we are” (8: p. 239). One cannot be a martial artist in the static sense
of having some property or possessing some status; one is a martial
artist only to the extent that one is always striving to become a better
martial artist.

Notes
1. It should be noted that Nietzsche’s corpus, and Thus Spoke Zarathustra, in
particular, are difficult works to interpret, and there is no settled
common interpretation among scholars of Nietzsche’s work. The
interpretation I am offering here is supported by the text, but given
the style and content of Nietzsche’s writing, such support cannot be
conclusive, and I acknowledge that there are compelling alternative
interpretations of Nietzsche’s work.
2. My focus on Thus Spoke Zarathustra is motivated, in part, by the fact that
this text is particularly focused on these more “positive” aspects of
Nietzsche’s ethical thought and by the desire to offer the novice a
more coherent picture of a single Nietzschean text. Although a more
wide-ranging exegesis would doubtless be worthwhile in principle, it
would overly encumber the present text. My more narrow focus may
not be ideal, but I believe it is sufficient, given my more modest
exegetical goals.
3. For Nietzsche, the lover of “orders of rank,” this is the difference between
those who operate on our own level (or better) and those who are
“beneath” us.
The Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, Vol. 34, No. 1 (May 2007): pg. 39-51. DOI. This article is © Taylor & Francis
(Routledge) and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Taylor & Francis
(Routledge) does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the
express permission from Taylor & Francis (Routledge).

16

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

4. Again, this does not mesh nicely with the standard use of the term
“hatred,” but Nietzsche does seem to be taking pains to draw a
distinction between hating and despising here. It may perhaps be best
to consider this a technical term for Nietzsche in this context—he is
using Hassen here in a particular way, even if that is not exactly how
the term is typically employed.
5. Of course, there are “practical” effects of these examples: flexibility,
strength, balance, mental focus, stamina, and so on. The point is not
that there are no practical benefits at all, but rather that these
practices transcend the purely practical in very important ways. There
are much more direct and efficient ways to gain these benefits, just as
there are more direct and efficient ways to protect oneself.
6. I want to stress again that at present I am making this distinction between
martial arts and more directly “practical” systems of fighting or sport
for purely rhetorical reasons. I am not saying that these latter kinds of
study and practice are less important or less valuable or even less
authentic than what I am calling martial arts. I am only saying that
there are important differences and that these are relevant differences
within the context of the present conceptual framework.
7. The efficiency to which I am referring here is purely in terms of violence as
an end goal. That is, efficiency in this sense would refer to the way to
do the most harm with the least effort (making handguns, for
example, always more efficient). Efficiency of movement, ways to
avoid “wasted” energy, and so on are all concerns of the martial arts
but not in relation to achieving a practical goal. Thus, the martial arts
are not indifferent to efficiency in all of its forms, but they are
indifferent to this highly instrumentalized “practical” efficiency.
8. This is often why people who claim to have “taught themselves” martial
arts from books or videos are held in such low regard by practicing
martial artists. Not out of some sense of elitism (though this may be
so in some cases), but precisely because the practicing martial artist is
aware of, even if unable to articulate, precisely this epistemic point.
9. This is true for all aspects of martial arts training and even, I would argue,
for the appellation of “martial artist” itself. One who trained for and
earned a black belt 10 years ago but hasn’t trained at all for the last 3
years cannot rightly be considered a martial artist any longer, since
what it means to “be” a martial artist is continued practice and
training. If this person should resume training regularly, then the
appellation will be appropriate again, just as it is appropriate for the
neophyte who has been training for a matter of months.
10. Two important points should be made here. First, I am focusing on the
notion of self-overcoming, not Nietzsche’s explicit views on race and
gender, which clearly clash with the view I am espousing here.
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11.

12.
13.

14.

15.

Although I cannot undertake a full defense of my interpretation here, I
believe that his stated views on these topics were ultimately
inconsistent with his larger ethical goals. Second, one of the central
aspects of self-overcoming is that one’s values and sense of worth do
not become ossified or static, nor reliant on others for their status.
Thus, racism and sexism can be understood to be inconsistent with
self-overcoming, even for the racist or sexist person. This does not
mean that the harm done by racism and sexism is the same for both
the perpetrator and the victim, merely that a commitment to sexist or
racist ideology is inconsistent with a commitment to self-overcoming,
even for the sexist or racist.
This is particularly clear in the case of sexism, since women have
historically been not only practitioners but even founders of traditional
martial arts, especially in China (the legendary female masters Ng Mui
and Yim Wing-Chun, for instance).
It should be noted that the exact nature and requirements of the pacifist
tenets within both of these traditions is still very much contested.
Indeed, a recent article in The New York Times described the extent to
which young athletes tend to stop exercise once that “external” goal of
victory is removed. See (1).
Again, this is only true within the context of the martial arts as I have
explicitly defined them. To be sure, professional kickboxers train so
that they can compete at the highest levels and thus earn greater
prize money, and members of the Olympic tae kwon do team train in
order to win medals. This is why the more general (and broad)
understanding of martial arts, which would include both the kickboxer
and the Olympian, is inadequate for my purpose, which is to hone in
on the artistic aspect of the martial arts.
There are plenty of counterexamples of martial arts tournaments. Some
of the largest “open” tournaments even have teams with commercial
sponsorship. And to the extent that victory in the tournament has
become the explicit end of the participant, I would argue that we have
left the realm of the martial arts and entered the realm of martial
sports.
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